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Introduction
1 As the capital  of China, Beijing is undeniably the key to understanding the country’s
architectural history. In Beijing, architectural expression and the process of architectural
production seem to be more directly linked with the dynamics of China’s state politics
and foreign relations. In the 1950s, Beijing was the main battlefield of architectural styles
and the epicenter of nationwide theoretical discussions regarding modernism and the
Soviet-inspired National Style. In the 1970s, it was the first city where changes in political
leadership were reflected by architectural decisions. 
2 In 1969, following the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese policy shifted from a
single emphasis on revolution to a more pragmatic focus on development. In the early
1970s, a group of important state buildings to accommodate foreign diplomats went up in
Beijing, including the Beijing International Club, the Friendship Store, and the Diplomatic
Residence Compound (DRC) of Jianguomenwai. Later, from 1972 to 1974, after Nixon’s
visit to China, Beijing Hotel East was built as the highest-level state hotel for diplomatic
use. In these buildings, the expression of a modernist aesthetics can be observed, albeit
still mixed with national form inherited from the National Style in the 1950s. 
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3 This group of diplomatic buildings have never been systematically studied, although they
are discussed in some studies of the development of Beijing’s embassy regions.1 Other
researchers  on  Beijing’s  architectural  history  have  concentrated  mainly  on  the
architecture and politics of the 1950s, or on such significant urban spaces as Tiananmen
Square and Chang’an Avenue.2 The emergence of modernism in the 1970s has yet to be
critically examined—neither the underlying flows of technical and intellectual knowledge
nor  the  latent  political  support  for  these  knowledge  flows  have  received  scholarly
attention. 
4 This  paper  adopts  a  tripartite  framework  to  examine  form,  knowledge,  and  politics
reflected through architecture. It will highlight the complex interconnections of political
shifts inside and outside China, the dynamic exchange of knowledge across distances, and
the  formal  moves  in  design  practice.  The  first  part  will  describe  the  political  and
intellectual  context.  Next,  we  offer  some  general  observations  about  these  1970s
diplomatic  buildings.  In  the  third  part  of  the  paper,  three  architectural  cases,  the
International Club, the DRCs of Jianguomenwai and Qijiayuan, and Beijing Hotel East, are
critically analyzed to reveal different facets of the interrelation between form, knowledge
and politics. 
5 This  paper  aims  to  acknowledge  the  significance  of  this  group  of  buildings  in  the
historiography of architecture in modern China, by positioning these buildings in the
early 1970s as an important episode in the development of modernism in China.3 In this
research, modernism was primarily defined as the architecture illustrated by the Bauhaus
and in the projects of Walter Gropius, Le Corbusier, Mies van der Rohe and Frank Lloyd
Wright, in the period of the 1920s and the 1930s. The formal-compositional attributes of
modernist architecture were best summarized as the International Style.4 Nevertheless,
modernism  cannot  simply  be  understood  as  a  style  or  a  label.  Rather,  the  formal
attributes should be used as clues revealing the deeper reverberation between the formal,
technological and theoretical aspects of Chinese practice and Western knowledge. 
6 To examine a history of modernism in China, several key episodes should be highlighted.
In the 1930s and 1940s, Streamline Moderne, exemplified by a series of public buildings in
Shanghai,  had already been introduced as a new style into some large coastal cities.5
Strictly  speaking,  it  was  not  the  modernism in  question  in  the  1970s  constructions.
However, in the late 1940s, some prominent figures adopted modernist trends for their
personal residences. For example, Sun Ke’s residence (1948) in Nanjing, was built in a
Wrightian modernist manner.6 In the years after the People’s Republic was established in
1949, especially in 1954, modernism was denounced as the antithesis of Soviet Socialist
Realism or the National Style.7 Later in the late 1950s and the 1960s, modernism was only
experimented with in peripheral practices.8 But the early 1970s seem crucial - in this
period, modernism achieved an explicit presence in mainstream practice, exemplified by
a whole group of state buildings, including some foreign trade buildings in Guangzhou in
addition  to  the  abovementioned  diplomatic  buildings  in  Beijing.  In  this  regard,  our
research on the 1970s buildings in Beijing could be considered as an attempt to recast the
historiography of modernism in China.
 
Political Shift and International Communications
7 From  1968  onwards,  the  Cold  War  gradually  came  to  détente,  largely  because  of
exhaustion from the Vietnam War and the rising mass movements in both the East and
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the West.9 American president Nixon and his National Security Adviser Kissinger adopted
a policy they called “triangular diplomacy” to obtain advantages for the United States in
relations with the Soviet Union and China. Their top priority was to end the Vietnam War
by improving the relationship with China.10 From a Chinese perspective, deteriorating
Sino-Soviet  relations  and  the  end  of  the  chaos  of  the  Cultural  Revolution  in  1969
facilitated a  Sino-American rapprochement,  despite  drastic  ideological  conflict  at  the
time. After a series of tacit contacts between China and the United States, Mao Zedong
and Nixon finally met in Beijing in 1972.11 Before their formal meeting, China joined the
UN in 1971, thanks to the support primarily from Third World countries. In this context,
China’s diplomatic relations with the United States,  Japan, Australia,  and many other
countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa were quickly established in 1970s. 
8 As to the domestic politics of China, Lin Biao’s death after a failed coup in 1971 became
the most important trigger for a series of changes in China’s state politics and foreign
policies.12 Lin Biao, as Vice Chairman and Minister of National Defense at the time, was
Chairman Mao Zedong’s designated successor. But the coup attempt ruined Lin Biao’s
clique in the military. It also weakened the whole leftist faction in the Party, including
the  clique  led  by  Mao’s  wife  Jiang  Qing.  After  Lin’s  death,  Zhou  Enlai,  the  major
pragmatist leader, quickly took power to stabilize political leadership. At the same time,
Zhou  accelerated  the  restoration  of  Sino-American  relations.  Meanwhile,  due  to  his
deteriorating health, Mao gradually withdrew from the forefront of political leadership.
But  Mao’s  prestige  in  China  was  already  unshakeable,  especially  after  the  mass
movements at the heights of the Cultural Revolution. Until his death in 1976, he could
still steer the whole country from backstage by mediating between the two major leaders
at the forefront, Zhou Enlai and Jiang Qing.
9 From 1969 to 1974, with the rise of Zhou Enlai, China’s state politics reached a dynamic
balance between the two factions. The pragmatists, led by Zhou Enlai,  took charge of
foreign affairs and domestic economic development, while the leftists, led by Jiang Qing,
continued to  control  the  artistic  production apparatus  and the propaganda effort  to
promote far-leftist ideology. Working in two clearly defined and separated realms, both
factions  were  backed  by  Mao,  who  wanted  to  continue  economic  development  and
strengthen the socialist faith at the same time. China in this period was paradoxically
going both “left” and “right”; despite radical communist ideology in art and propaganda,
pragmatist concerns governed economic development and foreign affairs. However, this
dynamic balance was broken from 1973 onwards,  largely due to a  resurgence of  the
leftists and their intervention into the realms of foreign affairs and economy.13 
10 When the pragmatists had the upper hand in the years from 1972 to 1974, international
communication between China and other countries was fairly lively. It was the first time
after  decades  of  seclusion  that  China  opened  to  the  West.  Foreign  architects  and
journalists noted the emergence of a “new architecture” in China: it  showed signs of
straying from Soviet influence and absorbing more Western influence.14 In April 1974, a
delegation from the American Institute of Architects (AIA) including AIA vice president
Bill Slayton and architect I. M. Pei was invited to visit China.15 Although Chinese media
paid little attention to this trip, it was widely covered in the West. Likewise, in these
years, the major Western architectural journals published a wave of reports on China’s
architectural progress.16 After 1974, communications with the West took place in greater
secrecy, largely due to interference from the leftists to suppress the pragmatists.  For
example,  in 1975,  when,  invited by the AIA,  the Architectural  Society of  China (ASC)
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delegation toured the United States, it did so “quietly.” The visit was not reported on in
China, and even the American coverage was very low profile. This was at the specific
request of the Chinese architects, who wanted to avoid criticism from the leftists at home
in China.17
 
Beijing Diplomatic Projects, 1969-1970s
11 The  institutional  structure  of  the  Beijing  government  was  heavily  impacted  by  the
turmoil of the Cultural Revolution and many senior government officials were ousted. But
into  the early  1970s,  with  the  support  of  Zhou  Enlai,  some  of  these  officials  were
rehabilitated, and new programs for economic development and urban construction were
proposed. Wan Li (a leader in Beijing government) and Zhao Pengfei (the secretary of the
State  Council),  who  had  long  worked  in  the  area  of  urban  construction,  were
rehabilitated. They began to assist Zhou Enlai in 1971, although they were not officially
appointed to their posts until 1973. In June 1971, Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) published an
article advocating that cadres be “rational promoters,” combining revolutionary spirit
and a scientific attitude.18 A rational, pragmatic atmosphere seemed to be on the rise,
balancing the political fervor prevailing at the time. 
12 In fact, as early as in 1969, under the aegis of Premier Zhou Enlai, a group of diplomatic
buildings, called the “Beijing Diplomatic Projects,” had already been proposed in the First
Embassy Region outside the Jianguomen Gate of the city wall. This group of buildings
included the Beijing International Club (1969-1972), the Friendship Store (1969-1972), and
the Diplomatic Residence Compounds (DRC) of Jianguomenwai and Qijiayuan (fig. 1).19 In
the early 1970s,  with increasing numbers of foreign diplomats coming to Beijing,  the
expansion of  the embassy district  and the construction of  these diplomatic buildings
became the most urgent and primary task for urban construction.
13 Beijing Hotel East was not included in the 1969 scheme, but was proposed in 1972, after
Nixon’s visit, and completed in 1974. It was the most important building project in Beijing
at the time. From 1974 to 1976, no more high-profile diplomatic buildings were proposed,
because of the suppression of the pragmatists. All of these buildings were designed by
architects from Beijing Institute of Architectural Design (BIAD) and supervised by Wan Li
and Zhao Pengfei.
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Figure 1: Diplomatic buildings in the 1970s.
1: Beijing International Club; 2: Friendship Store; 3: Jianguomen DRC; 4: Qijiayuan DRC; 5:
Beijing Hotel East Wing. A: Forbidden Palace; B: Tiananmen Square; C: Chang’an Avenue; D:
The Second Ring Road (not finished yet, part of which was still the old city wall); E: the
legation quarter; F: the First Embassy Region.
Source: Drawn by the author, based on a Beijing Transportation Map published in 1969.
14 These diplomatic buildings of the 1970s were built largely within the framework of the
Master Plan for Chang’an Avenue drafted in 1964. In the master plan, the buildings looked
highly functional, rejecting the ornamentation and “big roofs” that were promoted in the
1950s (fig. 2). In fact, a functionalism prevailed in the 1960s as a result of the suppression
of aesthetic concerns in architecture, especially during the Design Revolution launched in
1964.20 But this master plan also showed influences from the International Style, which
was not purely functional but had distinct aesthetic preferences. These are evident in the
vertical  and  horizontal  lines  on  the  austere  façade,  the  asymmetrical  and  dynamic
compositions of building volumes, and the rejection of decoration.21 These features were
further enhanced in the diplomatic buildings that were actually executed in the 1970s.
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Figure 2: Master plan of Chang’an Avenue in 1964 (part).
Source: Courtesy of the archive at School of Architecture, Tsinghua University. Yu Shuishan, Chang'an
Avenue, p. 103−143.
 
Beijing International Club, 1972
15 Beijing International Club was built as a community center for foreign diplomats living in
the embassy region. It was made up of five parts, including a gym (Part I), a recreation
area (Part II), a dining area (Part III), a cinema (Part IV), and a swimming pool (Part V)
(fig. 3). Beijing International Club also provided various services, such as a hairdresser
and reading room. The recreational activities it  offered were billiards,  bowling,  ping-
pong,  the  movies,  tennis  and  swimming.  The  compound  also  housed  venues  for
diplomatic activities, such as rooms for banquets, dining, receptions, meetings, and press
conferences. As a public building with complex programs, it attracted much attention
from architects, political leaders, and foreign guests in the 1970s. Now the intricate web
of form, knowledge, and politics woven around this building can be revealed.
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Figure 3: Ground floor plan of International Club, and the five parts.
Source: BIAD Jianwai Diplomatic Projects Design Team, “Guoji Julebu 国际俱乐部 [International Club],” 
Jianzhu Xuebao [Architectural Journal], no. 1, p.1973, p. 48−49; drawn by the author based on the
documentation drawings, courtesy of Beijing Urban Construction Archive.
16 Wu Guanzhang, a BIAD architect only in his thirties, was appointed as the chief architect
of this project,  supervising several  even younger architects including Ma Guoxin,  Liu
Yongliang,  and Song Shifen,  among others,  who were in their twenties.  These young
architects were actually the main workforces in BIAD in the 1970s. Wu Guanzhang was
born in 1933 and graduated from Tsinghua University in 1962. Another architect,  Ma
Guoxin, born in 1942, graduated from Tsinghua University in 1965. When they took up
this task in 1969, they had little experience with designing large-scale public buildings, let
alone  buildings  with  such  major  political  significance.  It  was  an  unusual  historical
phenomenon,  reflecting  a  shortage  of  experienced  architects  at  the  time.  After  the
outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, many senior architects had been criticized,
sidelined, “sent down”,22 and even persecuted. 
17 In the interview with Wu, he recalled the design process of this building with no special
pride. To him, it was just a small, simple project, by comparison with the much larger and
more complex projects he designed in the 1980s.23 His view was probably influenced by a
prevailing denouncement of the entire Cultural Revolution spanning the ten years from
1966 to 1976. This denouncement was formulated by the Chinese authority after the start
of the reform and opening up in 1978, serving for the political agenda at that time. Wu
may have underestimated the historical significance of his design during the Cultural
Revolution. 
18 I would argue that Beijing International Club should be regarded a nodal project that
broke away from the previous design paradigms and ushered in a new expression in
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architecture. It adopted an eclectic approach to mixing national form and modernism.
Compared to the National Style of the 1950s, it was much more simplified and restrained.
However,  compared  to  the  extreme  functionalist  approach  in  the  1960s,  the  design
showed much more consideration for aesthetics, manifest in the playful composition of
volumes and spaces, the exquisite façade, and the careful configuration of interior space.
This building signaled the shift in architectural character from austerity, solemnity, and
economy in the 1950s and the 60s to dynamism, intimacy, and exquisiteness in the 1970s. 
19 According to Wu, Wan Li, as his immediate superior, demanded that national form be
adopted, although Chinese-style “big roofs” were banned. A big roof was expensive and
useless, and more seriously, it became a symbol of “formalism” and “feudalism” after the
Party denounced the extravagant National  Style in 1955.  In this case,  only simplified
national forms were adopted, still reminiscent of traditional palatial architecture. The
façade composition followed classical rules, consisting of three segments – the base, the
body, and the top (fig. 4). The concrete roofs, beams, and balustrades all mimicked the
wood structure of traditional Chinese architecture.
 
Figure 4: Façade details of the International Club.
Source: Courtesy of BIAD Information Department.
20 The design also shares a complicated kinship with Western modernism, particularly a
Wrightian influence. It is evidence of the latent infiltration of Western modernism in
architectural education in the Mao era, when certain professors still secretly taught their
students about  the modernist  masterpieces by Le Corbusier,  Mies  van der Rohe,  and
Frank Lloyd Wright, among others.24 Wu admitted that he appreciated the architecture of
Wright in particular when studying at Tsinghua University.25 In fact, his teacher there,
Wang Tan (1916‒2001), was one of Wright’s most committed followers in China. Wang had
worked at Taliesin for one year, from 1948 to 1949, before assuming his teaching position
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at Tsinghua University.26 The influence of Frank Lloyd Wright in this case was evident—
the horizontality of façade composition and the semi-circular shape of the reading room
might be inspired by Wright’s Prairie-style houses. Even the drawing style of the floor
plan was arguably Wrightian: the depiction of trees, pergola, and the irregular pattern of
stone pavement all showed a strong intention to incorporate outdoor nature into the
interior. The simplified national form, and even some industrial components, were also
reminiscent of Wright’s use of abstracted decorations with local characteristics. 
21 Beyond the formalistic level, in China, admiration for Wright was also associated with an
intellectual context. Wright inspired many first-generation Chinese architects, including
Yang Tingbao, who began to reference Wright’s architecture as early as the 1940s.27 This
group of Chinese architects studied in the United States around the 1920s.  They first
learned the Beaux-Arts tradition embodied in the form of Western classical architecture
and later received the impact of modernism that originated from Europe. The Chinese
architects referenced both Beaux-Arts tradition and modernism, because the former was
effective in demonstrating monumentality, tradition, and national identity, and the latter
was  more  innovative,  playful,  and  compatible  with  modern  programs.  For  Chinese
architects, Wright was considered special among the “four modernist masters” (Wright,
Le Corbusier, Gropius, and Mies). Compared with the other three, his architecture was
both traditional and modern, and deeply rooted in regional traditions.  Therefore,  his
work was exemplary for Chinese architects seeking to combine elements from both the
Beaux-Arts tradition and modernism, while maintaining a national tradition.  Another
reason they felt a special bond with him was the fact that Wright’s reference to Japanese
traditional architecture further connected his architecture with Chinese philosophical
and architectural tradition. Wright admired Taoism, especially Lao-Tzu’s concept of the
“void,” which had inspired Wright to focus on the space enclosed by roofs and walls,
instead of roofs and walls themselves.28 In this respect, Wright was regarded a crucial
node within a complex network of knowledge exchanges between the East and the West,
formed in the nineteenth century. Wright demonstrated the compatibility between the
modernism of the West and the traditional philosophy and architecture of the East. 
22 In the 1970s, the expression of Chinese characteristics was required in the design of these
diplomatic buildings. Wright was naturally invoked as a major inspiration for Chinese
architects  seeking  to  reference  and  reinterpret  the  features  of  traditional  Chinese
architecture  within  a  modernist  approach.  In  the  Beijing  International  Club,  certain
features of traditional southern gardens were intentionally revived, especially the varied
configuration of the labyrinthine interior space, the playful arrangement of landscape
elements, and the penetration and continuity between interior and exterior. Actually, Wu
Guanzhang was born in Suzhou, a city famous for a rich collection of traditional gardens.
He openly admitted his inclination towards a “southern tradition” that favored dynamic,
playful architectural composition, instead of the monotonous, sterile forms that seemed
to him typical of architecture in Northeast China.29 
23 Apart from the architecture of Beijing International Club, what impressed the American
delegation of architects was the “extraordinary and extraordinarily large” silk tapestry
displayed in the East Entrance.30 In fact, the rich collection of artworks in this building
was loaded with political implications. Several representative art works were strategically
deployed in the interior space (fig. 5). To borrow terms from Jacques Rancière’s theory of
the relation between form and politics, the spatial distribution of these artworks, as a
“distribution of the sensible,” actually reflected a political order, and the contentions
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around these paintings were directly associated with the political tensions at the time.31
Five works of art were selected for analysis. The first two were traditional ink-and-wash
paintings on silk tapestry, or so-called Chinese painting. They were considered the most
important, and deployed at the two main entrances facing east and south. No. 3 and No. 4,
a mural titled “Cranes” and a tapestry titled “The Great Wall,” were both realistic court
style (gong-bi) paintings. No. 5, the “Panda,” was a paper-cut painting on glass, a Chinese
folk style.
 
Figure 5: Spatial distribution of selected artworks in Beijing International Club.
1): “High mountain and the flowing water” at the East Entrance; 2): “Lotus” at the South
Entrance; 3): “Cranes” at the multifunctional room; 4): “The Great Wall” at the upper
level of the cinema; 5): “Panda” at the cinema entrance.
Source: Drawn by the author.
24 The two Chinese ink-and-wash paintings were highly controversial in the mid-1970s.32 In
1971, Zhou called a group of sent-down artists, including Li Kuchan, back to Beijing to
paint “Chinese paintings” for several  state hotels  including Beijing Hotel,  the Beijing
International Club,  and the Minzu Hotel,  among others.  But later in 1974,  Jiang Qing
criticized these Chinese paintings, saying they were “black paintings” that smeared the
Party and the socialism.33 The “High Mountain and Flowing Water” in the East Entrance,
painted by Dong Shouping, was criticized as “black mountains and black waters” by the
leftists in 1974 (fig. 6). Similarly, the “Lotus” by Li Kuchan in the South Entrance was
criticized as a “black fable,” in which the eight dying lotuses symbolized the “eight model
operas”  promoted by Jiang Qing,  operas  that  no one wanted to  watch,  and the bird
symbolized Jiang Qing herself, who was angry about this (fig. 7).34
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Figure 6: “High mountain and flowing water,” circa 1971.
Artist: Dong Shouping.
Source: Academy of Building Research, Xin Zhongguo Jianzhu 新中国建筑 [Architecture of New China],
Beijing: Zhongguo Jianzhu Gongye Chubanshe, 1976.
 
Figure 7: “Lotus”, circa 1971.
Artist: Li Kuchan, South entrance of International Club.
Source: Academy of Building Research, Xin Zhongguo Jianzhu 新中国建筑 [Architecture of New China],
Beijing: Zhongguo Jianzhu Gongye Chubanshe, 1976.
25 In the Cultural Revolution, art, and especially fine art, was an important arena of political
struggle between the two factions. In particular, the two factions had contradictory views
towards  Chinese  painting.  The  leftists  considered  Chinese  painting  backward  and
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reactionary: they felt it represented the aesthetic appreciation of the “high art” by feudal
elitist intellectuals, as opposed to art for the masses. It was suppressed in the 1960s. Its
re-emergence in the early 1970s was closely associated with the needs of foreign affairs.
The pragmatists, on the other hand, considered Chinese painting essential for a display of
Chinese cultural  identity to foreigners.  The key divergence between the two factions
seemed to revolve around the differences in their attitudes towards elitism in art. The
pragmatists favored elitism if it emphasized an expression of Chineseness, but the leftists
opposed such elitism. 
26 In fact, elitism in the art realm was intrinsically related to elitism in politics, which was a
long tradition in China. Political elitism was suppressed in the 1950s and 1960s under the
leftist ideology. However, the diplomatic buildings in the 1970s represented a tacit revival
of a political elitism in the late Mao era. It was manifest in these diplomatic buildings in
both aspects of art and architecture. These buildings actually served a privileged group of
people  including  both  Western  foreigners  and  high-ranking  Chinese  officials.  Even
though the games available in the International Club, such as billiards and bowling, were
popular in Western clubs, they were actually exclusive recreations unheard of by most
Chinese people at the time. In this regard, the International Club resembled an oasis for
Westerners, where they could temporarily cure their homesickness, and a “heterotopia”
for Chinese officials, where they could enjoy a Western lifestyle (fig. 8).
 
Figure 8. Swimming pool, Beijing International Club.
Source: Courtesy of BIAD Information Department.
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Diplomatic Residence Compounds, 1970s
27 In the First Embassy Region, two DRCs,  Jianguomenwai DRC and Qijiayuan DRC, were
established on the northern side of Chang’an Avenue from 1955 onwards (fig. 9).35 The
apartment buildings built in the 1970s showed a formal language distinctively different
from that of the 1950s. This language shifted away from the Soviet-inspired National Style
and closer to the International Style. These buildings adopted simplified architectural
language  and  rejected  applied  decoration,  featuring  horizontal  lines  on  the  facade.
Among them, Buildings 12 and 14 were two 16-story high-rise towers; the horizontal lines
such as the balconies and eaves were emphasized on the façade, showing a lightness with
a tendency to fly (fig. 10). Later groups of buildings, including Buildings 15, 16 & 21, built
in 1975 in Jianguomenwai  DRC,  looked heavier than Building 12 & 14,  but  the crisp,
continuous horizontal lines were still emphasized on the facade (fig. 11).
 
Figure 9: Map of Jianguomen Outside DRC and Qijiayuan DRC.
Source: Drawn by the author.
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Figure 10: Qijiayuan DRC. Buildings 12 &14 (16 stories), Buildings 10, 11 &13 (4-6 stories), circa
1974.
Source: Courtesy of BIAD.
 
Figure 11: Jianguomenwai DRC.
Source: Courtesy of BIAD.
28 More  importantly,  these  high-rise  apartment  buildings  demonstrated  a  significant
progress in the technology of the construction industry in the 1970s, in particular the
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prefabrication  technique  called  large-panel  construction.  It  was  the  first  time  this
method had been employed for a high-rise prefab tower in China. 
29 China’s large-panel construction was initially supported by the Soviet Union in the 1950s.
Although mechanization in building industry and standard designs had been promoted by
Chinese  government  since  the  early  1950s,  large-panel  construction  was  never  fully
developed in the 1950s and 1960s. The main reason for the state government’s decades-
long hesitation was likely due to the lack of infrastructure for production, transportation,
and assembly of large prefab blocks.36 Only in the 1970s, when China had emerged from
the  turmoil  of  the  Cultural  Revolution  and  started  an  ambitious program  of
modernization,  was  large-panel  construction  valued  again  by  the  state.  The
experimentation in this housing complex for foreign visitors was indeed based on the
knowledge and experience accumulated in the decades of 1950s and 1960s.  But more
importantly, it benefited from the knowledge transfer from the more developed countries
to China in the 1970s. In 1973, Chinese architectural delegations were sent out by state
government  to  investigate  the  latest  developments  in  the  construction  industries  in
North Korea, Italy, France, and Japan.37 Chinese architects investigated new buildings and
factories,  paying  particular  attention  to  issues  related  to  high-rise  buildings,
prefabrication, and large panel construction. Interestingly, the Soviet Union, once the
teacher  and  the  “big  brother”  of  China,  a  country  where  large-panel  construction
technology  had  been  used  for  longer  than  anywhere  else  in  the  world,  was  not  a
destination for Chinese architects. The political reason was obvious—relations between
China and the Soviet Union had been deteriorating since the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, and
had not improved in the 1970s. 
30 Buildings 12 & 14, built in 1973, were the first high-rise residential towers over 10 stories
in Beijing.38 The construction adopted a new-model tower crane, which could grow taller
alongside  the  rising  building.  This  experiment  was  extolled  as  “a  big  step  into
industrialization,  mechanization,  and  prefabrication.” 39 The  main  structure  of  the
buildings was prefabricated, but the interior walls and rooftop were all conventional cast-
in-place, mixed with brickworks. From 1974 to 1975, more experimental prefab high-rise
towers were built in Beijing. The most important experiment was Buildings 15, 16 & 21.
They  were  the  first  buildings  that  fully  adopted  large-panel  construction  in  Beijing.
Compared with Buildings 12 &14, the level of prefabrication was much higher: all interior
walls and exterior panels were prefabricated. The structural plan was extremely simple
and regular so that various unit plans could be realized (fig. 12). The floor plan could be
divided into various units, each with 1-6 rooms, to include living room, kitchen, dining
room, and toilet.40
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Figure 12: Structural plan and floor plan of Building 15, 16 & 21.
Source: BIAD Design Team, “Gaoceng Waijiao Gongyu Damuban Qiangban Jiegou Sheji 高层外交公寓
大模板墙板结构设计 [the Structural Design of Large Wall Formwork of High-Rise Diplomatic
Apartment Towers],” Jianzhu Jishu [Architecture Technology], no. Z2, 1976, p. 28−33.
31 From the 1970s to the early 1980s,  the DRCs outside Jianguomen Gate were the most
modern district  in Beijing.  These buildings were inhabited by foreign companies and
government agencies, for example, the Lufthansa Airlines offices in Jianguomenwai DRC (
fig. 13). 41 For their Chinese employees, it might have been the first time they had worked
in Western companies since 1949.
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Figure 13: Interior, Jianguomenwai DRC.
Source: Courtesy of BIAD.
 
Beijing Hotel East, 1974.
32 From 1972 to 1974, a new state-level international hotel, Beijing Hotel East, was built next
to the old Beijing Hotel on the northern side of Chang’an Avenue (fig. 14). The Beijing
Hotel complex occupied a strategically important location, to the east of the Forbidden
Palace, north of Chang’an Avenue. It was one of the most prestigious state hotels for
foreign affairs in the Mao era.
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Figure 14: Beijing Hotel East and Chang’an Avenue.
Source: Courtesy of BIAD.
33 Beijing Hotel East as an extension of Beijing Hotel was directly triggered by Nixon’s visit
to Beijing. It was arranged for Nixon himself to stay in Diaoyutai guesthouse, the state
guesthouse where top leaders, including Jiang Qing, lived. But a large number of Nixon’s
staff had to live in the Minzu Hotel, dating from the late 1950s. Such a hotel was far below
international standards and could not satisfy the American guests. In Shanghai, Nixon’s
accommodations were in the Jinjiang Hotel, formerly a luxury apartment building in the
concession developed by English businessman Victor Sassoon in the early 1930s. At that
time,  it  was  equipped  with  modern  facilities,  such  as  elevator,  air-conditioning,
telephone, and comfortable bathrooms. These modern conveniences were rare even in
1970s Beijing.42 Premier Zhou Enlai was loath to see China’s backwardness in technology.
Moreover, during Nixon’s visit to China, Zhou was shocked by the way the latest
American  technologies  stood  in  sharp  contrast  to  China,  especially  satellite
communication and color television.43 Zhou was eager to modernize China by catching
up. Building new hotels equipped with modern facilities for future diplomatic use became
an urgent task. 
34 In 1972, two state hotel projects were proposed, including Beijing Hotel East and the
Baiyun Hotel in Guangzhou. Shortly after, a group of top architects in China were secretly
sent to Hong Kong and Macau to investigate the latest Western hotels there. This trip was
opposed by the leftist faction led by Jiang Qing, due to their hostility to the West. But with
the backing of Zhou Enlai, it went smoothly, supervised by the Ministry of Construction,
facilitated by the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese.44 
35 However, the factional struggle between pragmatists and leftists at the top level of state
politics interfered more dramatically with the later design and construction process of
Beijing Hotel East. Due to the overwhelming height and scale of this building, and more
importantly, its proximity to Tiananmen Square and Mao’s residence in Zhongnanhai, it
Architecture at a Political Turning Point: Diplomatic Buildings in 1970s Beijing
ABE Journal, 12 | 2018
18
triggered  a  series  of  political  crises  and  tensions.  Many  top  political  leaders  were
successively embroiled in them, including Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian (the vice premier in
charge  of  finance),  and  Wang  Dongxing  (the  chief  guard  of  Zhongnanhai  and  Mao
Zedong’s personal bodyguard).  Jiang Qing was an invisible but ubiquitous presence in
these crises, because she was the chief opponent of Zhou Enlai’s leadership in the Party.
Apart  from the  political  leaders’  disputes,  various  concerns  and  responses  from the
architects, construction managers, government officials, and the hotel managers further
complicated the process of design and construction. 
36 Similar to the design team of the Beijing International Club, that of Beijing Hotel East
consisted of mostly young architects. They were led by woman architect Cheng Delan.
Zhang Bo, an experienced architect in BIAD who had been dismissed in the late 1960s, was 
rehabilitated to serve as an advisor for the design team. He had designed many important
projects including the Beijing Friendship Hotel and the Great Hall of People in the 1950s,
and he maintained a good personal relationship with Zhou Enlai. His involvement was
backed by Zhou, but aroused the antagonism of the young architects in the team. Zhang
Bo documented the changes and struggles in the design and construction process in
detail in his autobiography.45 
37 In the first round of competition, Zhang Bo’s proposal No. 20 was selected by Zhou Enlai.46
His project had 13 floors, around 50 meters high, forming a harmonious relation with the
middle and western buildings of Beijing Hotel. The height, volume and architectural style
basically  conformed  to  the  1964  Master  Plan  of  Chang’an  Avenue.47 But  later,  Vice
Premier Li Xiannian suggested that the new building should be higher and bigger, given
that its location was so close to the center and Beijing was hosting more and more foreign
visitors every day. This suggestion was welcomed by the young architects in the team,
who  considered  Zhang  Bo’s  proposal  too  conservative  and  problematic  in  both
composition and programming.48 After a few rounds of revisions, the height was doubled
to 100 meters, consisting of 20 stories, with a meeting room and a banquet hall at the top,
specifically designed for Zhou Enlai to meet with foreign guests. 
38 In October 1974, when the building had risen to the fourteenth story, a dramatic incident
occurred.  Someone reported  that  the  new building  was  so  tall  that  Chairman Mao’s
residence  in  Zhongnanhai  was  visible  from  the  hotel.  The  threat  to  Mao’s  security
immediately  became  the  crucial  problem  concerning  everyone.  After  a  series  of
discussions on remedial measures, Zhou Enlai made a decision to build five screening
buildings, next to the Xinhua Gate of the Forbidden Palace, to block the view from Beijing
Hotel East to Zhongnanhai. This decision almost doubled the cost of construction works:
the screening buildings were about 21 meters high and 400 meters long, with a total area
of 50,000 square meters, similar to the area of Beijing Hotel East. Zhou’s decision seemed
to disregard economic cost  and the potential  damage to  the Forbidden Palace as  an
important historical heritage. It purely focused on resolving the political problem caused
by Beijing  Hotel  East.  In  that  particular  context,  this  was  understandable:  Zhou was
actually protecting himself from an attack by leftists, who might seize the opportunity to
frame an accusation of him, by exaggerating details. Zhou told Zhang Bo, “We have little
time left.”49 History proved that Zhou’s concern was reasonable and necessary. Soon after
the completion of Beijing Hotel East, Zhou himself was targeted by a political movement
to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius launched by Jiang Qing in 1974. He died of illness in
1976.
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39 The  final  built  form of  Beijing  Hotel  East  was  a  compromise  between  contradictory
aesthetic  preferences  corresponding  to  different  ideological  positions.  Similar  to  the
Beijing International Club, it showed a mixed influence from both Beaux-Arts tradition
and  the  International  Style.  But  compared  to  Beijing  International  Club  and  other
diplomatic projects outside Jianguomen Gate, Beijing Hotel East looked heavier and more
volumetric. This was not only a result of functional requirements and site limitation, but
also a deliberate aesthetic choice. In the design process, Zhou Enlai twice criticized that
the eaves of diplomatic buildings outside Jianguomen Gate were too thin and too light in
color;  to  him,  they  appeared  “unstable.”  Moreover,  Zhou  thought  that  the  formal
language seemed to be borrowed from the south (Guangzhou), which was not appropriate
to Beijing.50 According to Zhang Bo, Zhou demanded that he rectify these mistakes, and
for Beijing Hotel East he even suggested using liuli,  a traditional roof-tile material,  to
decorate  and  thicken  the  eaves,  given  that  a  “big  roof”  was  not  realistic.51 These
suggestions were welcomed by senior architect  Zhang Bo,  but opposed by the young
architects  and  workers.  To  them,  liuli, a  material  used  for  the  imperial  palace,  was
“backward” both functionally and symbolically. On the one hand, it decayed easily, and
on the other, it was reminiscent of “feudalism.” Zhou Enlai and Zhang Bo seemed to have
a more “conservative” aesthetic preference that favored classicism instead of modernism.
40 Interestingly,  even  though  the  interior  furniture  of  Beijing  Hotel  East  referenced
traditional Ming Dynasty designs, it was not targeted by either leftist leaders or young
architects. Simple, elegant Ming furniture was appreciated by the Chinese political and
intellectual elitists for a long time (fig. 15). Despite its association with “feudalism” and
elitism, it was not criticized as sharply as Chinese paintings or the Chinese roof, because
it  was  regarded  as  being both  modern  and  traditional,  bridging  the  two  opposing
aesthetics.
 
Architecture at a Political Turning Point: Diplomatic Buildings in 1970s Beijing
ABE Journal, 12 | 2018
20
Figure 15: Furniture in Beijing Hotel East.
Source: Courtesy of BIAD.
 
Conclusion
41 This discussion of the diplomatic buildings in 1970s Beijing intended to shed new light on
architecture and politics in late-Cultural Revolution China by analyzing the complexity of
architectural  aesthetics and the fluidity of  architectural  knowledge in relation to the
political struggles. 
42 The factional struggle between the pragmatists and the leftists is an important clue to
understanding the dramatic changes and instability in both state politics  and formal
expression in architecture and art, during the last seven years the Cultural Revolution
from 1969 to 1976. From 1969 to 1972, under the “dynamic balance” between the two
factions, a new architectural language closer to the International Style was formulated.
From 1972 to 1974, when the factional struggle became more intense, tensions around the
expression of Chineseness in art and architecture arose.  In the realm of fine art,  the
leftists tried to eliminate “Chinese painting” because of its association with an elitism in
politics.  But  the  pragmatists  considered  the  expression  of  Chineseness  in  both
architecture  and  art  as  necessary  for  a  demonstration  and  continuation  of  national
tradition  and  cultural  identity  of  China.  In  the  case  of  the  International  Club,  the
expression  of  Chineseness  was  achieved  in  a  modernist  framework.  However,  it  is
important to point out that the pragmatist leaders seemed to favor an expression of
Chineseness in a manner closer to the Beaux-Arts tradition, which was more classical and
monumental, as exemplified by Beijing Hotel East. 
43 As  buildings  accommodating  both  foreign  guests  and  state  leaders,  these  buildings
established an important diplomatic interface between socialist China and the West. The
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interior space decorated by rich traditional Chinese-style elements displayed not only a
message of welcome to foreigners, but also a Chinese cultural identity defined by Chinese
political  and cultural  elitists.  To the leftists,  the  modernist  façades  demonstrated an
egalitarian delusion, but also expressed the pragmatists’ message to both foreigners and
Chinese populace, signaling the end of the Cultural Revolution and the beginning of a new
political agenda towards modernization. 
44 In the design of these buildings, several knowledge flows, manifest both implicitly and
explicitly  in  the  architecture,  should  be  highlighted:  1)  the  national  form  for  an
expression of Chineseness in the 1970s was a continuation of the 1950s National Style
inspired by the Soviet Socialist Realism; 2) knowledge about Western modernism and
traditional Chinese architecture converged into an appreciation of Frank Lloyd Wright’s
architecture, handed down by the first generation of Chinese architects; 3) the secret
study trip to Hong Kong brought new models for Chinese architects for the design of
Beijing Hotel East; 4) the technology of large-panel construction was absorbed for prefab
high-rise towers.  These  knowledge  flows  across  distances  further  complicated  the
relation  between  form  and  politics.  Knowledge  about  Soviet  Socialist  Realism  and
Western  modernism  were  critically  absorbed  by  Chinese  architects  not  only  for  an
expression of Chineseness in architectural form, but also for an agenda of modernization.
Moreover,  the reference to  foreign architecture  and the transfer  of  knowledge were
tacitly supported and carefully channeled by the state government. 
45 As a final remark, this group of diplomatic buildings in the 1970s seems to occupy a
significant  place  in  the  architectural  history  of  modern  China.  In  particular,  the
expression of modernism reached an unprecedented climax, although modernism was
still  contested  throughout  the  1970s,  against  the  unstable  political  background.
Examining the history of modernism in China since the 1930s, the early 1970s were a
landmark: for the first time, the Chinese state authority presented its public image in a
modernist manner, albeit in the guise of an expression of Chineseness.
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ABSTRACTS
This paper highlights a group of buildings built in Beijing for diplomatic purposes in the 1970s, at
a turning point in China’s state politics and foreign relations. After the turmoil of the Cultural
Revolution ended in 1969, Chinese politics shifted from a single emphasis on revolution to a more
pragmatic focus on development. A dynamic balance between the two factions, the leftists and
the  pragmatists,  was  achieved  at  the  top  level  of  state  leadership  under  Chairman  Mao’s
mediation. At the same time, there was a significant breakthrough in China’s relations with the
Western countries,  culminating in Nixon’s visit  to China in 1972. For this increase in foreign
affairs, two batches of diplomatic buildings were built in Beijing from 1969 to 1976, before and
after Nixon’s visit. Three architectural cases are studied, namely, the International Club (1972),
the Diplomatic Residence Compounds of Jianguomenwai and Qijiayuan (1970s), and the Beijing
Hotel  East  (1974).  These  cases  reveal  a  complex  interrelation  between  formal  expression,
knowledge  transfer,  and  political  interference.  More  specifically,  the  expression  of  “Chinese
characteristics”, the absorption of Western modernism, the knowledge transfer of large-panel
construction,  and  the  interference  of  political  struggles  in  architectural  design  were  all
entangled in these cases. The paper concludes that in the early 1970s, these diplomatic buildings
embodied a strong intention to absorb modernism, marking a key moment in the historiography
of modernism in China in the twentieth century.
L’article  porte  sur  un  ensemble  d’édifices  construits  à  Pékin  pour répondre  aux  besoins
diplomatiques  des  années  1970,  époque  charnière  dans  la  politique  de  la  Chine  et  dans  ses
relations avec l’extérieur. Une fois la Révolution culturelle achevée, en 1969, la politique chinoise
est passée d’une concentration exclusive sur la révolution à un intérêt plus pragmatique porté au
développement.  Un  équilibre  dynamique  entre  les  deux  fractions  du  parti,  gauchistes  et
pragmatiques,  fut opéré  au  sommet  de  l’État  sous  l’arbitrage  du  président  Mao.  Au  même
moment,  s’effectuait  une ouverture  significative  dans les  relations  de la  Chine avec les  pays
occidentaux, processus qui a culminé en 1972 avec la visite de Richard Nixon. Cette mutation
croissante des relations extérieures a conduit à la construction, à Pékin entre 1969 et 1976, c’est-
à-dire avant et après la visite de Nixon, de deux ensembles de bâtiments diplomatiques. Trois de
ces réalisations sont étudiées ici : le Club International (1972), les complexes diplomatiques de
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Jianguomenwai et  Qijiayuan (années 1970),  et  l’aile  est  de l'Hôtel  Pékin (1974).  Ces exemples
révèlent  une interrelation complexe entre expression formelle,  transfert  de connaissances et
ingérence  politique.  Plus  précisément,  l’expression  de  « caractères  proprement  chinois »,
l’assimilation  du  modernisme  occidental,  le  transfert  de  connaissances  dans  l’emploi  de
panneaux préfabriqués, et l’interférence de luttes politiques dans la conception architecturale,
apparaissent  étroitement  liés  dans  ces  réalisations.  Il  ressort  en conclusion,  qu’au début  des
années  1970,  ces  édifices  diplomatiques  ont  représenté  une  intention  d’assimilation  du
modernisme, constituant ainsi un moment clé dans l’historiographie de ce mouvement dans la
Chine du XXe siècle.
Este  artículo  trata  sobre  un  conjunto  de  edificios  construidos  en  Pekín  en  respuesta  a  las
necesidades del cuerpo diplomático en la década de 1970, periodo bisagra en la política interna de
China y en sus relaciones con el exterior. En 1969, una vez culminada la Revolución Cultural, la
política  china  pasa  de  estar  centrada  exclusivamente  en  la  revolución  a  un  interés  más
pragmático por el desarrollo del país. Bajo el arbitraje del presidente Mao la cúspide del Estado
alcanza  un  equilibrio  dinámico  entre  las  dos  fracciones  del  partido,  la  izquierdista  y la
pragmática. En ese momento, China realiza una apertura significativa en sus relaciones con los
países occidentales, proceso que culminaría en 1972 con la visita de Richard Nixon. Este cambio
progresivo de las relaciones exteriores llevaría a la construcción en Pekín, entre 1969 y 1976, es
decir  antes y  después  de  la  visita  de  Nixon,  de  dos  conjuntos  de  edificios  diplomáticos.  Se
estudian aquí tres de estas realizaciones: el Club Internacional (1972), los complejos diplomáticos
de las avenidas de Jianguomenwai y Qijiayuan (años 1970), y el ala este del Hotel Beijing (1974).
Estos  ejemplos  revelan  una  interrelación  compleja  entre  expresión  formal,  transferencia  de
conocimientos e injerencia política. Y de manera más precisa, en dichas realizaciones aparecen
estrechamente  ligadas  la  expresión  de  «caracteres  propiamente  chinos»,  la  asimilación  del
modernismo occidental, la transferencia de conocimientos en el empleo de paneles prefabricados
así como la interferencia de luchas políticas en la concepción arquitectónica. Podemos concluir
que,  a  principios  de  los  70,  estos  edificios  diplomáticos  representaron  una  voluntad  de
asimilación del modernismo, constituyendo así un momento clave en la historiografía de este
movimiento en la China del siglo XX.
Der vorliegende Artikel  beleuchtet eine Gruppe von Bauten, die in den 1970er Jahren, einem
Wendepunkt der Politik und der auswärtigen Beziehungen Chinas, zu diplomatischen Zwecken in
Peking  errichtet  wurden.  Nachdem  die  Wirren  der  Kulturrevolution  1969  ein  Ende  fanden,
verlagerte  die  bis  dahin  auf  die  Revolution  fixierte  chinesische  Politik  ihren  Schwerpunkt
pragmatisch auf Entwicklung. Ein dynamisches Gleichgewicht zwischen Anhängern des linken
und des pragmatischen Lagers wurde auf höchster Staatsführungsebene durch die Vermittlung
des Vorsitzenden Mao erzielt. Gleichzeitig gab es einen entscheidenden Durchbruch in Chinas
Beziehungen zum Westen, der 1972 in Nixons Besuch in China gipfelte. Für diese Zunahme an
auswärtigen  Beziehungen  wurden,  von  1969  bis  1976,  vor  und  nach  Nixons  Besuch,  zwei
Ensembles  von  diplomatischen  Bauten  errichtet.  Drei  Fallstudien  stehen  hier  im  Blick:  der
Internationale  Club  (1972),  die  Diplomatenwohnanlagen  von  Jianguomenwai  and  Qijiayuan
(1970er  Jahre)  und  der  Ostflügel  des  Beijing  Hotels  (1974).  In  allen  drei  Beispielen  ist  ein
vielschichtiges  Zusammenspiel  von  formalem  Ausdruck,  Wissenstransfer  und  gegenseitigem
politischen Einfluss erkennbar.  Insbesondere hingen sie alle  mit  dem Ausdruck „chinesischer
Besonderheiten“, der Übernahme der westlichen Moderne, dem Wissenstransfer zum Plattenbau
und dem Einfluss politischer Auseinandersetzungen auf architektonische Gestaltung zusammen.
Der Artikel kommt zu dem Schluss, dass diese diplomatischen Bauten in den frühen 1970er
Jahren die entschiedene Absicht zur Übernahme des Modernismus verkörpern und somit einen
Wendepunkt für die Geschichte des Modernismus in China im 20. Jahrhundert darstellen.
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Questo articolo porta su un gruppo di edifici diplomatici costruiti a Pechino negli anni Settanta,
in un momento cruciale per la politica nazionale cinese e per le relazioni con gli esteri. Dopo il
tumulto della Rivoluzione Culturale, conclusasi nel 1969, la politica cinese si focalizzò in modo
pragmatico sullo sviluppo, piuttosto che concentrarsi unicamente sulla rivoluzione. Un equilibrio
dinamico tra le due fazioni, la sinistra e i pragmatici, fu raggiunto al vertice della leadership dello
stato, sotto la mediazione del presidente Mao. Allo stesso tempo, ci fu una svolta significativa
nelle relazioni della Cina con i paesi occidentali, culminata con la visita di Nixon in Cina nel 1972.
In  seguito  allo  sviluppo  degli  affari  esteri,  due  lotti  di  edifici  diplomatici  furono  costruiti  a
Pechino tra il 1969 ed il 1976, prima e dopo la visita di Nixon. L’articolo prende in esame tre
progetti architettonici: il Club Internazionale (1972), i complessi diplomatici su Jianguomenwai e
Qijiayuan  (anni  '70)  e  l'ala  est  del  Hotel  Pechino  (1974).  Tutti  rivelano  una  complessa
interrelazione tra espressione formale, trasferimento di conoscenze e influenze politiche. Nello
specifico, l'espressione di "caratteristiche cinesi", l'assorbimento del modernismo occidentale, il
trasferimento  di  conoscenza  della  costruzione  a  grandi  pannelli  e  l'interferenza  delle  lotte
politiche  nella  progettazione  architettonica  sono  elementi  che  si  amalgamano  nei  progetti
esaminati.  In  conclusione,  secondo  l’autore,  nei  primi  anni  ‘70  questi  edifici  diplomatici
rappresentavano  la  volontà  di  assorbire  il  modernismo,  segnando  un  momento  chiave  nella
storiografia del modernismo in Cina nel ventesimo secolo.
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